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MASSACHUSETTS'S CHAPTER 91:
AN EFFECTIVE MODEL FOR STATE
STEWARDSHIP OF COASTAL LANDS
Denise J. Dion Goodwin*
I. INTRODUCTION
The South Boston waterfront area has been described as the "last
frontier" of developable property along the highly coveted Boston water-
front.' As with most urban development projects, there are many stake-
holders with different and often competing interests in the South Boston
waterfront area, including landowners, developers, architects, historical
associations, neighborhood groups, local planning boards, and state
environmental agencies. Through the operation of Chapter 91, the
Massachusetts Public Waterfront Act, the Commonwealth has mandated that
another interest, the public's interest in tidelands, will not only be consid-
ered, but accommodated.
Massachusetts has taken a farsighted and comprehensive approach to
ensure that the shores of its sea remain the common property of its citizens.
Through Chapter 91 and its attendant permitting scheme, Massachusetts has
asserted its sovereign obligation to protect the public's interests in the shores
of the sea by regulating the development of tidelands in the Commonwealth.
As private property owners and municipalities seek to develop land along the
water's edge, the provisions of Chapter 91 provide the basis for the
Commonwealth to both review proposals for development and changes to
* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 1999.
1. See generally Water's Edge, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 25, 1998, special supplement.
Boston's Mayor Thomas Menino renamed the area the South Boston waterfront in June of
1999, some say as a political concession to South Boston residents, to settle the dispute
among stakeholders as to its name. Some stakeholders, including the head of the Boston
Redevelopment Authority, wanted to call the area the "Seaport district," which is the name
the area has been called since the major development projects were first proposed. See
generally Anthony Flint, In Waterfront Name, Control Issues Flip-flop Sparks Fears on S.
Boston Influence, BOSTON GLOBE, June 15, 1999 at BI. Because the name of the Seaport
area was only recently changed, many references in this comment refer to the project as the
Seaport District, rather than the South Boston waterfront.
46 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 5:45
existing waterfront structures, and require the inclusion of conditions that
promote public use of and access to the water.
The Rowes Wharf complex, built in the mid-i 980s, on Boston's Atlantic
Avenue is one of the more obvious examples of Chapter 91's success in
promoting public access without sacrificing commercial profit. In addition
to the archway that provides visual access to the water from the street,
Rowes Wharf features pedestrian walkways and plazas, public restrooms, a
marina, temporary boat dockage, ferry terminals, a watershuttle to Logan
Airport, and a public observatory in the rotunda.2 Although opponents of
Rowes Wharf questioned whether the public would feel comfortable walking
along the million dollar condominiums, anyone who has wandered through
the grand archway on a sunny New England day knows that this early fear
has proven unwarranted.3 It is questionable whether the developers would
have provided these significant public benefits without the existence of
Chapter 91.
Chapter 91 went largely unchanged from its adoption in 1866 until the
Supreme Judicial Court issued its landmark decision Boston Waterfront
Development Corporation v. Commonwealth, in which the court held that
even formerly submerged land that had been filled and built upon remained
impressed with a public trust.4 In 1983, the legislature responded to the
decision by amending Chapter 91 to ensure that tidelands are either
developed for a water-dependent use, or otherwise serve a proper public
benefit. Developers strongly objected to the new regulations, largely due to
the height and space restrictions that they mandated. Developers noted that
the height of Rowes Wharf would have caused the project to fall out of
compliance with Chapter 91 under the new regulations. 5 Because there was
considerable controversy over the amendments, the Department of Environ-
mental Protection did not issue its clarifying regulations until seven years
later in 1990.
The controversy over the regulations did not end once they were
promulgated by the DEP Two prominent Boston real estate attorneys, in a
1992 law review article, challenged the validity of the 1990 regulations on
2. See generally COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT/EOEA, COASTAL BRIEF No. 9, 21-23
(1994).
3. See generally John King, Developing the Waterfront Question: Should City and Rural
Shore Property Be Treated Differently? BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 26, 1989, at 25 (asking how
many people feel comfortable walking next to some rich person's condo).
4. Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 629, 633 (1977).
5. See King, supra note 3.
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several fronts. These critics of the 1990 regulations contended that the
regulations were overbroad in their jurisdictional scope, inflexible, and
created impermissible zoning-like restrictions. The critics also posed an
interesting statute of limitations issue, noted but not fully addressed by the
Boston Waterfront court, that could potentially undercut the Common-
wealth's ability to regulate tidelands that it had previously conveyed to
another party.
Because there has not been any litigation arising from the application of
the 1990 regulations to a development project, many questions surrounding
the regulations have gone unanswered by the courts. Given its far-reaching
scope and size, however, the South Boston waterfront project may present
an occasion for the courts to address some of the questions left unanswered
by the Boston Waterfront decision and the regulatory scheme so dependent
upon it.
This Comment first discusses the history of tideland ownership in
Massachusetts and the history of the public trust doctrine in the Common-
wealth, which provide the legal foundation for Chapter 91. The major
provisions of Chapter 91 and the controversial regulations promulgated in
1990 by the Division of Waterways of the Department of Environmental
Protection are then discussed. This Comment concludes that the agency did
not exceed its delegated authority in enacting the 1990 regulations that give
administrative effect to the provisions of Chapter 91. Finally, to highlight
the role the statute continues to play in the creation of living and working
waterfront communities, this Comment examines the South Boston Seaport
project as a specific example of the way in which Chapter 91 is administered
at the agency level.
II. LEGAL FOUNDATION FOR CHAPTER 91
Chapter 9 l's statutory scheme is based upon the public trust doctrine as
it has been articulated by the United States Supreme Court and subsequent
Massachusetts state court decisions. This section describes the history of the
public trust doctrine in Massachusetts and how it has shaped Chapter 91 into
its current form. Although the public trust doctrine has been widely
accepted as a valid legal doctrine, it does stand on somewhat shaky ground
because it lacks roots in either constitutional or English common law.
6. See John A. Pike & Herbert W. Vaughan, Massachusetts Tidelands Laws and
Regulations, 78 MAss. L. REv. 98 (1992).
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A. History of Tideland Ownership in Massachusetts
Tideland ownership in Massachusetts originated with a compromise
between the common law principle that the English king could not convey
the portion of a parcel of land subject to ajus publicum7 , and the colonists'
recognition of the importance of maritime commerce for the growth of the
colony.8 The colonists brought to the Commonwealth the public trust
doctrine, based upon natural law and codified by the Romans, that the air,
running water, the sea and the shores of the sea are common property to all.9
The colonists, however, also had to find a way to promote maritime
commerce if the Commonwealth was going to succeed. To balance the
Commonwealth's interests in protecting public trust rights and promoting
maritime commerce, the colonists enacted the Colonial Ordinances of
1641-1647; the ordinances granted property owners title to the low water
mark, subject to the public's traditional rights of fishing, fowling and
navigation, while the Commonwealth retained title to the tidelands below the
low water mark.' °
As a result of the Colonial Ordinances, Massachusetts became one of the
few coastal states that extend the upland owner's title to the low water
7. By the law of all civilized Europe, before the feudal system obtained in England,
there was no such thing as property in tide waters. Tide waters were res omnium,
that is, they were for the common use, like air and light .... In England, the
fiction of a fee in the Crown, and the control of the trust in Parliament, we
understand to have been a mode, suited to the times and genius of the feudal law,
for insuring to the State the control over tidewaters. The Commonwealth
succeeds to this right of control.
Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. at 633 (quoting 1850 SEN. Doc.
No. 119, at 2). As with the people of all states after the American Revolution, the people of
the Commonwealth acquired the "absolute right to all ... navigable waters and the soils
under them for their own common use." Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842).
8. See Commonwealth v. Roxbury, 75 Mass. 451 (1857).
9. See J. Inst. 2.1.1.
10. The ordinance stated in part:
Every inhabitant who is an householder shall have free fishing and fowling in any great
ponds, bayes, Coves and Rivers, so far as the Sea ebbs and flowes, within precints of
the towne where they dwell, unless the freemen of the same Town or the General Court
have otherwise appropriated them.... [I]n all Creeks, Coves and other places, about
and upon Saltwater, where the Sea ebbs and flowes, the proprietor of the land
adjoining, shall have propriety to the low-water mark, where the Sea both not ebb
above a hundred Rods, and not more wheresoever it ebbs further. Provided that such
proprietor shall not by this liberty, have power to stop or hinder passage of boats or
other vessels, in or through any Sea, Creeks or Coves, to other mens houses or lands.
The Book of the General Lawes and Liberties at 50, cited in Opinion of the Justices, 365
Mass. 681, 685 (1974).
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mark." Most coastal states instead hold title to lands below the high water
mark, and thereby limit the upland owner's title to the high water mark.
Courts have interpreted the purpose behind the Commonwealth's extension
of upland title to the low water mark in the Colonial Ordinances as evidence
of the Commonwealth's intent to induce the erection of wharves for the
benefit of commerce. 3 The colonists reasoned that if upland owners were
granted title to the land up to the low water mark, subject to the public's
rights of fishing, fowling, and navigation, the owners would be induced to
erect wharves and other aids to navigation that would in turn foster maritime
commerce. 4 Therefore, although private upland ownership in Massachusetts
has included tidelands landward of the low water mark since the Colonial
Ordinances were enacted, this extension of ownership from the high water
mark to the low water mark originated from the Commonwealth's intent to
confer a public benefit upon its citizens, not from an intent to confer a
benefit upon private owners.
B. State's Role as Guardian of Public Trust Rights
The public's rights of fishing, fowling and navigation, to which private
ownership of tidelands is subject, would be meaningless without sovereign
protection of these rights through enforcement. The United States Supreme
Court held in Shively v. Bowlby, that each state has the authority to define
the scope of its own public trust." It was in this recognition of the state's
role as guardian of the public's interest in submerged lands that moved the
Supreme Court, in its landmark decision Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, to
hold that a state can only grant parcels of submerged land to private parties
when there is a corresponding significant public purpose served by the
grant.'6 Moreover, a legislative grant necessarily became revocable once the
I1. SeegenerallyJOSEPHJ.KALOETAL., COASTALANDOCEANLAW 13 (2nd ed. 1994).
12. See id.
13. See, e.g., Storerv. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435,438 (1810); Commonwealth v. Roxbury,
75 Mass. 451,515 (1857); Boston WaterfrontDev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d356,
360 (Mass. 1979).
14. See Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. at 630.
15. See Shivelyv. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894). The Supreme Court stated:" [B]ut leave
the question of the use of the shores by the owners of uplands to the sovereign control of each
State, subject only to the rights vested by the Constitution in the United States." Id. at 58.
16. See Illinois Central R.R.v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,452 (1892). The Court concluded
that an Illinois Act which granted a private corporation rights in submerged land in Lake
Michigan could be repealed because abdication by the state of its general control over its
navigable waters was not consistent with the trust devolved upon it to preserve such waters
for the public's use. See id. at 453. In a 1997 law review article, James Rasband has
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public purpose ceased to exist. 7 As the Supreme Court stated: "The State
can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are
interested.., so as to leave them entirely under the control of private parties
... than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government
and the preservation of the peace."' 8 Therefore, although individual states
have the authority to define the scope of their public trust doctrines, they do
not have the authority to relinquish their obligations over these unique
parcels of land unless there is a significant corresponding public purpose
served by the relinquishment.
Massachusetts has taken seriously its sovereign duty, mandated by the
United States Supreme Court, to protect the public trust rights of its citizens.
The Massachusetts legislature recognized the necessity to regulate harbor
development as early as 1835.9 In 1851, the legislature's power to regulate
the upland owner's rights in tidelands was upheld by the Supreme Judicial
Court in Commonwealth v. Alger.20 The court held the "legislature has
power, by a general law affecting all riparian proprietors on the same line of
shore equally and alike, to make reasonable regulations, declaring the public
right, and providing for its preservation by reasonable restraints, and to
enforce these restraints by suitable penalties."2' Having received affirmation
of its authority from the Supreme Judicial Court, the legislature took an
additional step to protect the public's interests in tidelands by establishing
a licensing board to protect the public interest in tidelands, establish harbor
lines, and prescribe plans for all tideland construction.22 This act governing
tidelands development was eventually codified into its current form in 1866
as Massachusetts General Law chapter 91.23
challenged the validity of linking the equal footing doctrine of Shively v. Bowlby with the
public trust doctrine in Illinois Central. Rasband suggests that the two cases are
irreconcilable because the Shively court focused on the state's intent to convey whereas
Illinois Central focused on the state's power to convey. See James R. Rasband, The
Disregarded Common Parentage of the Equal Footing and Public Trust Doctrines, 32 LAND
& WATER L. REv. 1, 18-21 (1997). Rasband, however, also notes that only a handful of state
courts have refused to follow Illinois Central. See id. at 21.
17. See Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. at 452.
18. Id. at 453.
19. See generally ARCHER ET AL., THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND THE
MANAGEMENT OF AMERICA'S COASTS 168 (1994).
20. Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. at 53.
21. Id. at 95.
22. See 1866 Mass. Acts c.149.
23. ARCHER, supra note 19, at 169. In general, a Chapter 91 license is required if there
has been an alteration in tidelands, great ponds, and certain rivers and streams. Types of
structures requiring authorization include piers, wharves, floats, retaining walls, revetments,
pilings, bridges, dams and waterfront buildings. Some structural changes and changes in use
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C. The Legacy of Boston Waterfront Development Corp.
v. Commonwealth
Neither the courts nor the legislature of the Commonwealth made any
further attempt to define the scope of the public trust doctrine in Massachu-
setts until the Supreme Judicial Court rendered a highly controversial
decision in 1979.24 In Boston Waterfront Development Corp. v. Common-
wealth, the court engaged in a lengthy review of the history of the public
trust doctrine in Massachusetts and held that even formerly submerged land
that had been filled and built upon remained impressed with a public trust.'
Although the Lewis Wharf statutes at issue in Boston Waterfront purported
to grant fee simple title, the statutes also provided that "nothing herein
contained shall be understood as authorizing said corporation in any way to
interfere with the legal rights of any person or persons whomsoever.
2 6
Based upon this conditional language in the granting legislation, the court
determined that the private owners of formerly submerged land held title to
"its property in fee simple, but subject to the condition subsequent that it be
used for the public purpose for which it was granted.' 27 Although the
decision has been characterized as sending shock waves through the real
estate bar,2" the reaction to the decision is somewhat surprising because the
court did not announce a new legal principle, but instead relied upon a
common law principle, based upon Roman law, that had been in existence
ofpreviously licensed structures may also require a new Chapter 91 license. See MASS. GEN.
LAWs ch. 91 (1996). Since its adoption in 1866, more than 17,000 licenses have been granted
under Chapter 91. See David B. Struhs, Protecting the Public's Rights to Our Waterfronts
Commissioner's Column - May 1997, (visited Jan. 21, 1999, last updated June 26, 1997)
<http://www.state.ma.us/dep>.
24. See ARCHER, supra note 19, at 169.
25. See Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 629 (1977). The
plaintiff sought to register title to tidelands, obtained by legislative grant and subsequently
filled and improved upon, in fee simple absolute without any limitation or condition upon its
use. The court rejected the claim. See id. at 630.
26. Id. at 637 (citing 1834 Act. St. 1835, c. 76). The Supreme Judicial Court was not
concerned with the absence of statutory language indicating what should become of the land
granted to the private corporation to further the purpose of maritime commerce should that
commerce cease to exist because:
At that time, it was probably inconceivable to the men who sat in the
Legislature ... that the harbor would ever cease to be much used for commercial
shipping, or that a wharf might be more profitable as a foundation for private
condominiums and pleasure boats than as a facility serving public needs of commerce
and trade.
Id. at 648.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Pike & Vaughan, supra note 6, at 98.
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for centuries in the Commonwealth. The court, in effect, only reminded the
Commonwealth, that with regards to property in the intertidal zone, private
ownership is never presumed absolute.
In an advisory opinion,z9 the Supreme Judicial Court clarified the Boston
Waterfront decision by acknowledging the possibility that the Common-
wealth could extinguish public trust rights in tidal flats, once filled, if certain
conditions existed.30 To meet the test, the legislation must explicitly define
the land involved, explicitly acknowledge the public interest surrendered,
and recognize the new use to which the land is to be put; there must also be
a valid public purpose behind the grant that extinguishes the public trust
rights.3' Although the court did not attempt to describe the type of
legislation that might meet this standard, the court's language, especially its
use of "explicitly" as a modifier, suggests that a private party that seeks to
register title to filled tidal flats must meet a relatively high burden of proof
before that party will convince a court that the Commonwealth relinquished
its public trust obligations. 2
As critics of Chapter 91 have pointed out, one question the Boston
Waterfront decision left unanswered is whether the statute of limitations
found in General Laws (G.L.) chapter 184 section 23 and chapter 260
section 31A 33 bars the Commonwealth from pursuing a right of action against
29. Advisory opinions are not binding for stare decisis purposes, but instead are issued
to address specific questions posed to the Court by the legislature. See Opinion of the
Justices to the Senate, 373 Mass. 883, 366 N.E.2d 733 (Mass. 1977).
30. See Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 383 Mass. 895, 905, 424 N.E.2d 1092
(1981).
31. See id. The public purpose requirements also reflect the Appleby v. City of New
York, 271 U.S. 364 (1926), decision in which the United States Supreme Court held that a
state could convey fee title to submerged lands only if its legislature concluded that such a
conveyance was in the public's interest. See id.
32. Although the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has not since interpreted a
statute that purports to relinquish the public trust, the California Supreme Court has noted that
such statutes "are to be strictly construed; the intent to abandon must be clearly expressed or
necessarily implied; and if any interpretation of the statute is reasonably possible which
would retain the public's interest in tidelands, the court must give the statute such an
interpretation." City of Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda, 606 P.2d 362, 369, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980). In a decision that relied heavily upon Boston Waterfront, the
Vermont Supreme Court boldly noted that restaurants, hotels, and shopping malls are not
examples of appropriate public uses encompassed by the contemporary public trust doctrine.
See State of Vermont v. Central Vt. Railway, Inc., 571 A.2d 1128, 1136 (Vt. 1989).
33. Section 3 1A reads in pertinent part:
No proceeding based upon any right of entry for condition broken or possibility of
reverter, to which a fee simple or fee simple determinable in land is subject, created
before the second day of January, nineteen hundred and fifty-five shall be maintained
in any court after the first day of January, nineteen hundred and sixty-four, unless on
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a party for breach of the condition subsequent at issue in the case.34 This
issue potentially poses a problem for the Commonwealth if developers
challenge its jurisdiction on the basis of the loose language articulated by the
Boston Waterfront court on this point. Because the Court found that the
parties did not adequately raise the issue, it noted that its remarks were only
"suggestive of the outlines of the issue, and not determinative of the
result."'3 The Boston Waterfront court began its outline of the issue with the -
thirty-year rule for the existence of conditions on land imposed by G.L.
chapter 184 section 23.36 Having found that that the conveyance at issue in
the case met both exceptions to the rule,37 the Court then outlined the issue
in terms of chapter 260 section 31A.38 When section 31A was originally
enacted in 1956 to limit the viability of conditions created before 1955, the
statute applied "to all such rights whether or not the owner thereof is a
corporation or a charity or a government or governmental subdivision .... "'
This language appeared to include the Commonwealth in its application. In
1968, however, the legislature amended section 31A to read: "This section
shall apply to all such rights whether or not the owner thereof is a corpora-
tion or a charity or a government or governmental subdivision, other than the
commonwealth... ."0 In 1974, the general court deemed it necessary to
enact further clarifying legislation to fix with certainty the inapplicability of
the statute to commonwealth grants and conveyances. 4 Because the Boston
Waterfront Development Corporation originally filed its petition for
registration between 1956 and 1968 (before the statute was amended to
specifically exempt the Commonwealth from its application), the issue, as
noted by the court, was whether, and if so how, the after-the-fact expression
of legislative intent affected the rights of the parties.42
or before the first day of January nineteen hundred and sixty-four, (a) the condition has
been broken or the reverter has occurred, and a person... having the right of entry or
reverter shall have taken possession of the land... or (b) a person... having the right
of entry, or who would have it if the condition were broken.., shall ... have filed...
a writing... describing the land and the nature of the right ....
MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 260, § 31A (1996).
34. See Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. at 651.
35. Id.
36. See id. at 652.
37. The conveyance existed on July 16, 1887 and it was contained in a grant of the
commonwealth. See id.
38. See id.
39. Id.
40. Id. (citing St. 1968, c. 496).
41. See St. 1974, c. 527, §1.
42. See Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. at 653.
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Although the Boston Waterfront Court narrowly outlined the issue in
terms of the Commonwealth's right of action against a party who filed for
registration during the time period when the applicability of section 3 1A to
the Commonwealth was at least questionable, the Supreme Judicial Court in
a later case applied the Boston Waterfront analysis in a much broader
context.43 In Manning v. New England Mutual Life Insurance Co., the court
held that the plaintiffs were barred from obtaining enforcement of certain
building restrictions, which appeared in conveyances of land by the
Commonwealth, because of the failure to re-record them as required by G.L.
chapter 184, section 28. 44 The land restriction at issue in Manning was a
setback restriction in a conveyance by the Commonwealth to conform to a
comprehensive land use plan.45 The court rejected the plaintiff's argument
that section 28 did not apply to restrictions in conveyances by the Common-
wealth.46 The emergency act in 1974 to clarify the application of section
31 A to the Commonwealth also included a statement of the non-applicability
of section 28 to Commonwealth conveyances.47 Unlike section 1 of
Massachusetts Statutes 1974, chapter 527, which dealt with section 3 IA,
section 3 dealing with section 28 was deleted in 1975. The Manning Court
concluded that the deletion of that language, contrary to the plaintiff's
contention, operated to bring conveyances by the Commonwealth back
within the scope of section 28.
The Manning Court did not consider the Boston Waterfront decision
until the very end of its decision, where it made a sweeping statement
without any subsequent analysis to indicate its reasoning.49 The Supreme
Judicial Court, in response to an argument put forth by the plaintiff that the
43. See Manning v. New England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 399 Mass. at 736. The plaintiff,
who owned abutting property to the defendant, objected to the defendant's building set back
distance often feet when the Commonwealth restrictions required a twenty-five feet set back
and unsuccessfully sought judicial enforcement of the restriction which the Commonwealth
had failed to re-record in compliance with G.L. c.184, § 28. See id.
44. See id. at 731. Section 28 reads in pertinent part:
No restriction imposed before January first, nineteen hundred and sixty-two shall be
enforceable after the expiration of fifty years from its imposition unless a notice of
restriction is recorded before the expiration of such fifty years or before January first,
nineteen hundred and sixty-four, whichever is later, and in the case of such recording,
twenty years have not expired after the recording of any notice of restriction without
the recording of a further notice of restriction.
MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 184, § 28 (1996).
45. See Manning v. New England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 399 Mass. at 731.
46. See id. at 733.
47. St. 1974, c.527, § 3.
48. See Manning v. New England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 399 Mass. at 733.
49. See id. at 735-736.
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restrictions constituted a public trust and should therefore not be subject to
section 28, stated: "We conclude that, even if the Commonwealth had a
continuing interest of this (public trust) nature, it was extinguished by the bar
imposed by G.L. c.184, § 28. Cf. Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v.
Commonwealth."5 The court implied in its statement and corresponding
citation that the Boston Waterfront decision supports the conclusion that the
Commonwealth's public trust interests would be extinguished if not recorded
within the statutory period mandated by section 28. However, Boston
Waterfront fails to support such a conclusion for many reasons. The most
apparent flaw is that the Boston Waterfront court explicitly stated that it was
only suggesting an outline and not issuing a determination on the statute of
limitations issue. Moreover, the Boston Waterfront court did not even
contemplate section 28. Instead, it narrowly focused on the application of
section 31A to the Commonwealth's right of action between the years of
1956 and 1968.5
Another flaw with the Manning court's conclusion is that it seems to
equate the setback restriction then before it with the condition subsequent at
issue in Boston Waterfront. There are, however, significant differences
between these two restrictions. The Commonwealth did not impose the land
restriction at issue in Manning pursuant to its role as guardian of the public
trust. Instead, the Commonwealth imposed the set back restrictions on
landlocked property in the Back Bay of Boston to conform to an 1850's
comprehensive landuse plan in which the Commonwealth filled certain tidal
flats for residential use.52 When the Commonwealth conveyed the parcels,
it did not subject the conveyance to any public trust restrictions, but instead
sold the lots for dwellings subject only to land use restrictions.53 Although
the restrictions at issue in Manning and Boston Waterfront were both
imposed in conveyances by the Commonwealth, their similarities end there.
Therefore, because the Manning court had already determined that the
setback restrictions on the landlocked parcel were not in the nature of a
public trust, it had no reason to reach the issue of the effect of section 28 on
the Commonwealth's public trust interests. Moreover, the Commonwealth's
public trust interests are arguably more akin to the interests created by a
public charitable trust than to the land use interests the court found subject
to the mandates of section 28. The Supreme Judicial Court has held that the
recording requirements imposed by section 28 are not applicable to land held
50. Id. at 736.
51. See Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 629, 653 (1977).
52. See Manning v. New England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 399 Mass. at 731.
53. See id.
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by public charitable trust in perpetuity.14 Like the obligation impressed by
the public charitable trust upon a town to guarantee the public's interest in
a park, as found in Dunphy, the public trust doctrine impresses a similar
sovereign obligation upon the Commonwealth to protect the public's interest
in their public trust rights. Perhaps the court should have at least undertaken
an analysis of the inapplicability of section 28 to public charitable trusts
before it concluded that section applied to public trust interests.
Given the narrow scope of the Boston Waterfront court's treatment of
the statute of limitations issue, and the distinction between the restriction at
issue in Manning, the Supreme Judicial Court overreached when it
summarily concluded, without meaningful analysis, that section 28 would
extinguish the Commonwealth's continuing public trust interests.5 Finally,
section 28 was enacted to prevent enforcement of obsolete, uncertain or
unenforceable restrictions. 6 As the remaining sections ofthis Comment will
demonstrate, Chapter 91 makes evident that the restrictions placed on
formerly submerged, filled tidelands at the water's edge are neither obsolete,
uncertain nor unenforceable.
Although the courts in Manning and Opinion of the Justices have
attempted to limit the holding of Boston Waterfront, the decision has not
been overruled. The Massachusetts courts continue to uphold the legitimacy
of the public trust doctrine in protecting the public's rights to fishing,
fowling and navigation. In fact, as recently as 1998, the Supreme Judicial
Court noted "the paramount attendant legal circumstance: namely that like
all privately owned tidal areas in Massachusetts, the locus lying between the
mean high and low water marks is and always has been subject to the Public
Trust Doctrine."57
54. See Dunphy v. Commonwealth, 368 Mass. 376 (1975).
55. At the very least, a reasoned analysis of the issue would necessarily include
reconciling the limited circumstances in which the court, in Opinion of the Justices, found
the Commonwealth could extinguish its public trust rights with section 28, which does not
purport by its express terms to surrender a public interest. See Opinion of the Justices to the
Senate, 383 Mass. 895, 905 (1981).
56. See generally Labounty v. Vickers, 352 Mass. 337 (1967).
57. Sheftel v. Lebel, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 175, 689 N.E.2d 500, 505 (1998) (holding that
although the owner of flats is without power, in absence of legislative authorization, to use
them in such manner as would hinder or obstruct public navigation rights, the public has no
right of perpendicular access across private upland property for the purpose of gaining access
to the water or flats in order to exercise public trust rights).
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III. CHAPTER 91 - THE STATUTORY SCHEME
A. Overview of Statutory Provisions
As mentioned above, the Massachusetts legislature first regulated
waterfront development in 1835, through the establishment of a tidelands
licensing board, and did not make substantive changes to that statutory
scheme until the Boston Waterfront case was decided. It is important to
note, however, that a commission, established in 1850 to study the effects of
filling tidal flats concluded that when an individual demand for land
conflicts with the public demand for water, the public demand should
prevail.59 This basic presumption, which further evidences the Common-
wealth's early commitment to the public trust doctrine, is the basis upon
which the regulatory scheme is built.
Taking its cue from the Boston Waterfront decision, the legislature
revised Chapter 91 in 1983 to make it conform it to the public trust
principles affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court.60 In response to the
court's recoguition that the mere filling of formerly submerged tidelands did
not remove the public's rights to those parcels, the legislature amended
Chapter 91 to promote the public's rights in filled as well as submerged
tidelands. The amendments recognize the different interests the public has
in different portions of tidelands. The legislature changed the licensing
scheme to give priority to water-dependent uses over non-water-dependent
uses 61 and the inclusion of formerly filled flats within Chapter 91 jurisdic-
tion.62 This section discusses these changes in the context of their relation
to the public trust doctrine in Massachusetts.
1. Changes in Definition of "Tidelands"
The definition of tidelands is critical because the Commonwealth only
has licensing jurisdiction over those coastal areas included within the
definition of tidelands. Tidelands are defined in Chapter 91 as present and
former submerged lands and tidal flats lying below the mean high water
58. See ARCHER, supra note 19, at 169 (describing the only significant developments
as pertaining to the designation of the appropriate agency for administration of the licensing
laws).
59. See id. at 168 (citing Report of the Commissioners in Relation to the Flats in Boston
Harbor, SEN. Doc. No. 3, at 12, 15, 16, 18 (1850)).
60. See id. at 173.
61. SeeMASS.GEN.LAwsch.91 § 14(1996).
62. 1983 Mass. Acts. c. 589 § 21.
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mark.63 The phrase "former submerged lands" is included within the
tidelands definition as a direct result of the Supreme Judicial Court's holding
in Boston Waterfront that formerly submerged land64 remains subject to the
condition subsequent that it be used for a public purpose. Because the
Commonwealth can convey ownership in submerged land lying below the
low water mark only when a significant public purpose is served by the
conveyance, the public has a heightened interest in formerly submerged land
that remains adjacent to the water. Thus, it follows that the legislature would
amend its definition of tidelands to include formerly submerged land.
Tidal flats are defined as the area between the mean high water mark and
the mean low water mark.65 Although the public's interest in tidal flats is
limited to fishing, fowling and navigation, the public has a reserved
easement in tidal flats as a matter of law.6 6 Because the public retains public
trust rights to tidal flats, the legislature was justified to include tidal flats
within the definition of tidelands so as to exercise the Commonwealth's
sovereign obligation.
The legislature further defined tidelands by classifying them as either
commonwealth or private. Under Chapter 91, commonwealth tidelands are
subject to different licensing requirements than are private tidelands.
Commonwealth tidelands are defined as "tidelands held by the common-
wealth in trust for benefit of the public or held by another party by license
or grant of the commonwealth subject to an express or implied condition
subsequent that it be used for a public purpose., 67 This definition, which
includes tidelands to which another party holds title, directly reflects Boston
Waterfront's decision that the public purpose requirement is presumed to
attach to legislative grants of tidelands. Because commonwealth tidelands
include tidelands that are either held by the state or held by another party
subject to the condition that the parcel be used for a public purpose, there is
a heightened public interest in this classification of tidelands; these tidelands
should then be regulated differently from tidelands in which the public does
not possess such an interest.
Private tidelands are defined as "tidelands held by a private party subject
to an easement of the public for purposes of navigation and free fishing and
63. SeeMASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 91 § 1(1996).
64. In an advisory opinion, the Supreme Judicial Court noted that the submerged land
referred to in the Boston Waterfront decision was land lying below the historic mean low
water mark. See Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 383 Mass. 895, 901 (1981).
65. See id. at 902.
66. See Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 80 (1851).
67. Id.
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fowling and ofpassing freely over and through the water.' 68 Because private
tidelands are not subject to a condition subsequent that they be used for a
public purpose, the Commonwealth's authority to regulate them is limited
to the protection of traditional public trust rights; it does not extend to
imposing a public purpose requirement on the use of the land.
2. Prioritization of Water-Dependent Uses
69
Chapter 91, in addition to the distinction between commonwealth and
private tidelands, distinguishes between water-dependent and non-water-
dependent uses in its regulatory scheme. The Commonwealth has the
authority to license:
the construction or extension of a wharf, pier, dam, sea wall, road,
bridge or other structure, or for the filling of land or flats, or the
driving of piles in or over tide water below the high water mark, but
not, except as to a structure authorized by law, beyond any estab-
lished harbor line, nor, unless with the approval of the governor and
council, beyond the line of riparian ownership."
The 1983 amendments to section 14 of Chapter 91 added language that
makes clear the primacy of water-dependent uses over non-water-dependent
uses of tidelands. The amended section 14 provides, in part: "Except as
provided in section eighteen, no structures or fill may be licensed on private
tidelands or commonwealth tidelands unless such structures .. . are
necessary to accommodate a water-dependent use."7' The amendment
farther qualifies the Commonwealth's ability to issue licenses on common-
wealth tidelands to only those structures or fill which provide a greater
public benefit than public detriment to the public's rights in those lands.72
However, there is no corresponding public purpose requirement for a water-
68. Id.
69. Water-dependent uses are defined as:
those uses and facilities which require direct access to, or location in, marine or tidal
waters and which therefore cannot be located inland, including but not limited to:
marinas, recreational uses, navigational and commercial fishing and boating facilities,
water-based recreational uses, navigation aids, basins, and channels, industrial uses
dependent upon waterbome transportation or requiring large volumes of cooling or
process water which cannot reasonably be located or operated at an inland site.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 91 § 1 (1996).
70. Id. § 14.
71. Id.
72. See id.
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dependent use on private tidelands because, by definition, private tidelands
are not held subject to the requirement that they be used for a public purpose.
Despite section 14's requirement that uses be water-dependent, section
18 does provide a mechanism for granting a license for a non-water-
dependent use. The Commonwealth may grant a license for a non-water-
dependent use of private tidelands upon "written determination that said
structures or fill shall serve a proper public purpose and that said purpose
shall provide a greater public benefit than public detriment .... ""
Given the nature of the public trust doctrine and that it developed around
the public's rights to water, it would be difficult to argue that the primacy of
water-dependent uses was a new concept when the legislature added to the
statute in 1983. Instead, the amendments pertaining to the priority of water-
dependent uses can be interpreted as a clear and unambiguous recognition
that the public trust doctrine is the legal foundation upon which Chapter 91
is built.
B. The 1990 Regulations
In 1990, the Department of Environmental Protection74 promulgated an
extensive regulatory scheme to implement its statutory obligations.75 The
general purposes of the regulations are to:
(a) protect and promote the public's interests in tidelands ... in
accordance with the public trust doctrine, as established by common
law and codified in the Colonial Ordinances of 1641-47 and
subsequent statutes and case law of Massachusetts; (b) preserve and
protect the rights in tidelands of the inhabitants of the Common-
wealth by ensuring that the tidelands are utilized for water-depend-
ent uses or otherwise serve a proper public purpose; (c) protect the
public health, safety and general welfare as it may be affected by
any project in tidelands... (d) support public and private efforts to
revitalize unproductive property along urban waterfronts, in a
manner that promotes public use and enjoyment of the water; and
(e) foster the right of the people to clean air and water, freedom
from excessive and unnecessary noise, and the natural, scenic,
73. Id. § 18.
74. St. 1990 c.177, § 150 substituted the Department of Environmental Protection for
the Department of Quality Engineering in the definition of "Department."
75. MASs. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 9.01-9.55 (1996).
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historic, and esthetic qualities of their environment under-Article
XCVII of the Massachusetts Constitution.76
This section addresses some concerns that critics have voiced about the 1990
amendments.
1. Geographical Jurisdiction
The controversy over the 1990 Regulations is primarily based upon
regulatory interpretations of some key terms defined in Chapter 91." The
DEP enacted regulations that authorize it to presume that tidelands are
commonwealth tidelands if they lie "seaward of the historic low water mark
or of a line running 1650 feet seaward of the historic high water mark,
whichever is further landward. ' 78 This presumption may only be overcome
when the DEP issues a written determination based upon either a final
judicial decree concerning the tidelands in question, or some other conclu-
sive legal documentation that tidelands are unconditionally free of any
proprietary interest by the Commonwealth.79
These regulations are controversial because they presume that all
tidelands within certain geographical boundaries are Commonwealth
tidelands and therefore subject to an express or implied condition subsequent
that they be used for a public purpose. Given, however, that it is the
geographical location of tidelands that subject it to the public trust doctrine,
the agency charged with the administration of Chapter 91 would reasonably
start with a geographic classification. Moreover, title to land seaward of the
low water mark is either owned by the Commonwealth, in trust for the
public, or owned by another party subject to the condition that the land be
used for a public purpose.
Although an advisory opinion is often cited 0 for the proposition that the
Commonwealth can extinguish the public's interests in submerged land, the
opinion also provides a list of very limited circumstances under which the
Commonwealth can do so. Meanwhile, legislative authority to extinguish
the public's interest in submerged lands is dependent on the legislature's
creation of explicit legislation that concerns the land involved.81 Such
legislation must acknowledge the interest being surrendered and recognize
76. Id. § 901(2).
77. See, e.g., Pike & Vaughan, supra note 6.
78. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 9.02 (1996).
79. See id.
80. See, e.g., Pike & Vaughan, supra note 6, at 98.
81. See Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 383 Mass. 895, 905 (1981).
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the public use to which the land is to be put as a result of the transfer.82 The
court further limits the legislature's authority to extinguish the public's
interest in submerged land by requiring both that the action be for a valid
public purpose, and that any benefit to a private party must not be primary
but incidental.83 According to the court, "[t]he paramount test should be
whether the expenditure confers a direct public benefit of a reasonably
general character, that is to say, to a significant part of the public, as
distinguished from a remote and theoretical benefit." 4 Given the stringent
criteria described above, it was then reasonable for the DEP to find that
tidelands meeting the geographical criterion of lying beyond the low water
mark are presumed to be commonwealth tidelands, absent a contrary
determination by a judicial body.
2. Overbreadth
The Supreme Judicial Court has found it permissible for the legislature
to delegate its power and responsibility to regulate tidelands subject to the
public trust to an administrative agency.85 The Department of Environmen-
tal Protection, in conjunction with the Executive Office of Environmental
Affairs, is the agency delegated by the legislature to establish procedures,
criteria and standards for uniform and coordinated administration of the
provisions of Chapter 91.86 Critics argue that the DEP has exceeded this
delegated authority by enacting regulations that are overbroad.87
Critics base their contention on the fact that a parcel of land can be
brought under Chapter 91's regulatory jurisdiction as Commonwealth
tidelands under the 1990 regulations, but not according to the Chapter 91
definition of Commonwealth tidelands.88 This contention, however, is based
on the assumption that a grant of former submerged lands by a duly
authorized warranty deed from the Commonwealth, without an express
reservation or implied condition subsequent that it be used for a public
purpose, would be excluded from the statutory definition of Commonwealth
tidelands. This may not necessarily be the case. The courts have not had
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id. (quoting Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 368 Mass.
880, 885 (1975)).
85. See Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 383 Mass. at 919-920.
86. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21A §2 (1994). See also, MAss. REGS. CODE tit.310,
§ 9.01(1) (1996).
87. See e.g. Pike & Vaughan, supra note 6, at 108.
88. See id.
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occasion to rule on whether the existence of a warranty deed or
consideration 9 alters the result in Boston Waterfront. Moreover, given the
public purpose requirements necessary for a state to give away the public's
interest in submerged land, it is difficult to conclude that a court would
determine that the existence of a warranty deed removes any implied
condition subsequent that the land be used for a public purpose. The
warranty deed, in order to extinguish the public's rights in submerged land,
would presumably have to meet the same requirements to which a legislative
grant is subject. Because no court has held to the contrary, there would be
no reason for a court to find that a warranty deed, without an express
acknowledgment of the interest being given up and the public benefit
conferred by the transfer from the Commonwealth to the private party,
negates the implied condition subsequent. Given the uncertainty whether
submerged land transferred by warranty deed, rather than legislative grant,
contains an implied condition subsequent that the land be used for a public
purpose, the tidelands conveyed in this manner could fall under the statutory
as well as the regulatory definition of Commonwealth tidelands.
3. Zoning-Like Restrictions
A third criticism of the 1990 regulations is that the DEP overstepped its
authority through its enactment of zoning-like restrictions on the develop-
ment of tidelands in the Commonwealth.9" Critics argue that the restrictions
set forth in the regulations are akin to zoning restrictions and because the
power to enact zoning restrictions has been reserved to local governments,
the legislature lacks authority to enforce these regulations." This argument,
however, is based on the assumption that because the Zoning Act enables
local governments to enact zoning restrictions, 92 the Commonwealth itself
lacks the power to do so. Regardless of local government's authority to
enact zoning regulations, the Commonwealth retains the power to enact
zoning regulations by virtue of its police power.
89. Although the Massachusetts Court of Appeals made reference to its lack of
consideration in Boston Waterfront Development Corporation v. Commonwealth, 6 Mass.
App. Ct. 214, 374N.E. 2d 598, 606 (1978), the Supreme Judicial Court left out any reference
to the relevance of consideration in its opinion. See Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v.
Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 629 (1979). In another case the Massachusetts Appeals Court
held that current owners of tidelands hold the property subject to the same limitations under
which the Commonwealth held them, and some consideration was paid in that case. See
Newburyport Redev. Auth. v. Commonwealth, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 206, 238 (1980).
90. See Pike & Vaughan, supra note 6, at 109.
91. See id. at 110.
92. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A (1996).
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The Forty-ninth Article of Amendment to the Massachusetts Constitu-
tion in relevant part states:
The people shall have the right to clean air and water, freedom from
excessive and unnecessary noise, and the natural, scenic, historic,
and esthetic qualities of their environment; and the protection of the
people in their right to the conservation, development and utilization
of the agricultural, mineral, forest, water, air and other natural
resources is hereby declared to be a public purpose. The general
court shall have the power to enact legislation necessary or expedi-
ent to protect such rights.93
There is also common law support for the Commonwealth's authority
to regulate tidelands. The Commonwealth's interest in the shore "tran-
scends the ordinary rules of property law."94 In Commonwealth v. Alger, the
court found that "the legislature has power, by a general law affecting all
riparian proprietors on the same line of shore equally and alike, to make
reasonable regulations, declaring the public right, and providing for its
preservation by reasonable restraints, and to enforce these restraints by
suitable penalties."95
A zoning enactment is presumed constitutional and will be sustained
upon showing of a rational connection between the regulation and a
legitimate state interest.96 The regulations that distinguish the standards to
preserve water-related public rights97 from the standards to protect water-
dependent uses,98 and the standards for non-water-dependent use projects are
zoning-like in their nature and effect.99 There is, however, a strong
connection between the regulations and the legitimate state interests the
regulations seek to protect. The distinction between the standards for water-
related rights and water-dependent uses comply with the different public
interests associated with each category. The standards for water-dependent
93. MASS. CONST. amend. art. 49.
94. See Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. at 650.
95. Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 95 (1851). See also Bd. of Appeals of
Hanover v. Housing Appeals Comm. in Dep't of Community Affairs, 294 N.E.2d 393 (Mass.
1970) (finding legislature's zoning power may be used where interests of public require such
action and where the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
that purpose).
96. See Sturges v. Chilmark, 402 N.E.2d 1346, 1353 (Mass. 1980).
97. MASS. REGS. CODE. tit. 310, § 9.35.
98. See id. § 9.36.
99. See id. §§ 9.51, 9.52.
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uses are the least stringent because the DEP presumes the proper public
purpose requirement is met if the project is a water-dependent use project."
Standards to preserve water-related rights include provisions to ensure
a project will not "significantly interfere" with public rights of navigation,
free passage over and through the water, access to town landings, and on-
foot passage for purposes of fishing, fowling, and navigation.' It is
important to note that the regulations modify the word interfere with
"significantly." The DEP's final determination, In Matter of. Sari Lipkin,
interpreted the regulations as contemplating "that some disruption or
interference with navigation will be tolerated, so long as it is not signifi-
cant."'10 2 Moreover, the regulations also provide for mitigation through the
mandate of public benefits should some interference with water-related
public rights prove unavoidable. 3 The prohibition of significant, as
opposed to de minimus, interference and the existence of mitigation provide
flexibility in the administration of the regulations.
The most stringent standards are used in determinations regarding non-
water-dependent use projects because such projects presumably diminish
public access to water rights. In order to compensate the public for the
diminishment of their rights to the water, the regulations require substantial
measures to meet the public purpose test. The regulations specify that the
project site shall include both exterior open spaces for active or passive
recreation and pedestrian amenities."° The regulations also require non-
water-dependent use projects to devote interior space to facilities of public
accommodation. 5 Perhaps the most "zoning-like" regulations are the
numerical standards for setback distances, coverage ratios, height limits, and
minimum widths for public walkways along the water.0 6
Other mitigating factors to the somewhat stringent standards are the
extensive public notice and participation requirements mandated by the
regulations.'0 7 Upon receipt of a permit application, the DEP is required to
100. See id. § 9.31(2)(a).
101. See id. § 9.35(2), (3).
102. In the Matter of. Sari Lipkin, No. 92-043, 1995 WL 805814 (Mass. Dep't Envtl.
Protection. Dec. 22, 1995). The DEP also found that safe navigation is not specifically
identified as a standard. See id.
103. See MAss. REGS. CODE. tit. 310, § 9.35(1).
104. See id. § 9.53(2)(b).
105. See id. § 9.53(2)(c). Examples of public accommodation include the public rest-
rooms found in several structures, such as Battery Wharf, Burroughs Wharf, the Pilot House,
and Rowes Wharf, along Boston's waterfront. See generally Water Closets on the Water-
front, BOSTON GLOBE, May 4, 1998.
106. See MASS. REGS. CODE. tit. 310, § 9.51.
107. See id. § 9.13.
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send notice of the application to the municipal official, the planning board,
the conservation commission, and the harbormaster in the city or town where
the proposed project is to be located.'0 8 The DEP is also required to give
notice to all landowners of the proposed project site and abutters thereto,'19
and to the New England Division of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. "o
If the proposed project falls under other specific provisions, the notice must
be issued to an even greater number of parties."' In addition, the regula-
tions place a duty on the license applicant to furnish notice at his or her own
expense.1 2 The applicant is required to publish notice in at least one
newspaper with circulation in the area affected by the project," 3and if a
public hearing is to be held, the applicant is also required to post notice
visible to the public in one or more prominent locations on the site." 4
Given the more stringent standards that apply to non-water-dependent
projects, the public hearing requirement is contingent upon determination of
the project as a non-water-dependent use. For non-water-dependent use
projects, the DEP "shall" hold a public hearing in the city or town in which
the project is located. "5 The absence of discretion with regards to non-water-
dependent projects is consistent with the agency's recognition that these
projects, which do not necessarily have to be located at the water's edge,
might prevent the public from exercising their public trust rights. For water-
dependent use projects however, the DEP is afforded discretion in determin-
ing whether or not to hold a public hearing." 6 Individuals, though, are
provided the opportunity to request that the DEP exercise its discretion in
108. See id. § 9.13(1)(a)1. Notice consists of the name and address of the applicant, a
description of the location of the project, a description of the project, public hearing
information if applicable, the date until which public comments will be accepted, the address
where the application may be viewed, and a statement that a municipality, ten citizen group
or any aggrieved person that has submitted written comments may also petition to intervene
to become a party before the close of the public comment period and that failure to submit
such a petition will result in the waiver of any right to an adjudicatory hearing. See id. §
9.13(1)(c).
109. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 9.13(1)(a)(6) (1996).
110. See id. § 9.13(I)(a)7. Depending upon the type of project, the DEP may also be
required to provide notice to the harbormaster, Coastal Zone Management, Department of
Environmental Management, Department of Fish and Wildlife and to Environmental Law
Enforcement. See id. § 9.13(1)(a).
Ill. See, e.g., id. § 9.13(l)(a)2-5.
112. See id. § 9.13(1)(b).
113. Seeid. § 9.13(1)(b)1.
114. See id. § 9.13(1)(b)2.
115. See id. § 9.13(3)(a).
116. See id. § 9.13(3)(b).
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favor of a public hearing; the request must be made in writing within the
public comment period, and include a statement of reasons." 7
In addition to the procedural safeguards of notice, comment, and
hearing, the 1990 regulations provide a mechanism for municipal planning
boards to interject their recommendations on a particular license
application. 18 The regulations allow a municipality to hold its own public
hearing on a license application and submit a written recommendation to the
DEP. The written recommendation must state whether and why the planning
board believes the project would not be detrimental to the public rights in the
tidelands and serves a proper public purpose, except in the case of water-
dependent use projects entirely on private tidelands." 9 If the municipality
submits a written recommendation within the time period established by the
regulations, the DEP "shall" take into consideration the recommendation in
making its decision whether to grant a license. 2°
4. Evidence of Regulatory Flexibility: The Municipal Harbor Plan
Provisions
Perhaps most telling of the flexibility inherent in the Chapter 91
regulations is the alternate mechanism they provide for non-water-dependent
use projects to meet the public benefit requirements necessary to obtain
approval from the DEP. The municipal harbor plan'.' provisions provide a
flexible mechanism for non-water-dependent use projects to comply with
Chapter 91. A project must first comply with applicable zoning ordinances
of the municipality;'2 compliance is determined upon written certification
issued by a municipal official.12 In addition, aproject must comply with the
Coastal Zone Management Plan, where applicable, and relevant state
environmental regulations to ensure that the regulations are but one
component of a well-managed, integrated coastal zone development plan.
117. See id. § 9.13(3)(c). If a public hearing is held, any person may submit written
comments to the DEP on the license or permit application within ten days of the close of the
public hearing or within any additional public comment period granted by the DEP. See id.
§ 9.13(4)(a). If no public hearing is held, the comment period runs for thirty days after the
license application or fifteen days after the notification date for a permit application. See id.
§ 9.13(4)(b).
118. See id. § 9.13(5).
119. Seeid. § 9.13(5)(b).
120. See id.
121. A municipality develops a harbor plan in accordance with the provisions in MASS.
REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 23.03-.07.
122. See id. § 9.34(1).
123. See id.
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A project's conformance with a municipal harbor plan is determined
by the DEP in consultation with the planning board or other agency
responsible for plan implementation.' 24 The DEP strongly presumes that the
municipality's finding of compliance or noncompliance is correct. However,
no such presumption exists when the project requires a variance from the
substantive provisions of the plan, unless such a deviation is unrelated or
only de minimusly related to the purposes of Chapter 91.'2' If the DEP
determines that the project does comply with the Municipal Harbor Plan, the
use limitations or numerical standards specified in the Municipal Harbor
Plan may be substituted for the limitations and standards found in Chapter.
91: 9.51(3)(a) on-site replacement requirement forpile-supported structures;
9.51(3)(c) set back distances; 9.51(3)(d) coverage ratios, open space
requirement; 9.51 (3)(e) height limits; 9.52(1)(b) 1 minimum width ofpublic
walkways along water; 9.53(2)(b) open space for public passive recreation;
9.53(2)(c) devotion of indoor space to facilities of public accommodation.' 26
The municipal harbor plan provisions provide an alternate means for
projects to comply with Chapter 91 through satisfaction of the numerical
standards of the harbor plan. To ensure that municipalities do not develop
plans that sacrifice the public's interests in tidelands, however, safeguards
are included in the development of the municipal harbor plan. In order for
the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs to approve a municipality's
proposed harbor plan, the municipality must first demonstrate that the
substitute provisions set forth in the plan will promote, with comparable or
greater effectiveness, the state tidelands policy objectives stated in the
corresponding provisions of3l10 Code of Massachusetts Regulations 9.00.127
In addition, should the substitute provisions contain alternative use
limitations or numerical standards less restrictive than those found in the
waterways regulations, the plan must include requirements for the mitigation
of any potential adverse effects on water-related public interests.1
28
Therefore, even though the regulations require stringent standards,
particularly on non-water-dependent projects, the regulations do provide for
an alternate means by which a project can comply with Chapter 91.
124. See id. § 9.34(2)(1).
125. See id. § 9.34(2)(2).
126. See id. § 9.34(2)(b).
127. See id. § 23.05(d).
128. See id.
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IV. CHAPTER 9 'S SUCCESS IN PROMOTING WORKING
AND LIVING WATERFRONTS
Although the Massachusetts courts have not had occasion to rule upon
the validity of the 1990 regulations, as of the writing of this Comment, the
fact that developers who seek Chapter 91 licenses appeal no further than the
agency level may indicate that developers are convinced that the courts
would likely uphold the regulations. The Fan Pier parcel in South Boston
illustrates how Chapter 91 has encouraged developers, state environmental
agencies, municipal land use boards and interested citizens to take a "stop
and think" approach to development along the water's edge.
In 1997, the Boston Properties Group proposed a development plan for
an 800 room hotel at a height of 225 feet on the Fan Pier site in South
Boston. 2 1 In addition to violating the nineteenth century seaside maxim
"nothing higher than a whale by the water,"' 30 the building height would
have exceeded the restrictions imposed by the 1990 regulations by fifty to
sixty feet.' The developer primarily asserted that completion of a new
environmental impact report, as required under the Massachusetts Environ-
mental Policy Act, was unnecessary.' The developer also initially argued
that the land parcel was not subject to Chapter 91 jurisdiction because it was
transferred from the Commonwealth to a private party by a warranty deed
and for considerable consideration.'33 The DEP, however, rejected the
developer's contention and determined that the project was indeed subject
to Chapter 91 jurisdiction. 34 The developer did not appeal this determina-
tion. 35 Meanwhile, instead of issuing a decision regarding the need to
129. See Anthony Flint, Waterfront Plan Headedfor Snags City Proposal Conflicts with
State Law, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 9, 1997, at Al.
130. Jane Holtz Kay, Vision for a Livable Waterfront, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 16, 1998,
at A17.
131. See Anthony Flint, Official Working to Refuel Pier Plan Patience, Flexibility Key,
BRA Head Says, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 10, 1997, at B1.
132. See id. The developers argued that the impact report prepared for a prior proposal
sufficed because the project had not changed significantly enough to warrant the preparation
of a new impact statement. See id.
133. See Richard Kindleberger, Fan Pier Developers Contend Project is Exempt From
State Tideland Regulations Developers: Fan Pier Free From Tideland Rules, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 18, 1997, at A31.
134. See Karleen Kozaczka, Fan Pier's 1986 Review Defended But Critics Say
Environmental Impact Needs Reevaluation, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 30, 1998, at B3.
135. Perhaps if the developers had not been so compliant and had decided to appeal the
determination that the Commonwealth had jurisdiction to regulate the land under Chapter 91,
the court would have been presented with another opportunity to send shockwaves through
the conveyancing bar.
2000]
70 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 5:45
complete a new impact statement, the Secretary of the Executive Office of
Environmental Affairs asked the developer to put the project on hold until
a harbor plan was created for South Boston.136 The developer voluntarily
agreed to the Secretary's request. 37  Although there are always environ-
mental and citizen concerns when any major development project is
undertaken, Chapter 91 requires developers to address public use and access
issues before the ground is broken. Prior to the Secretary's determination
that the Fan Pier project fell within the jurisdiction of Chapter 91, the
developer's plan called for tall buildings that would have created offensive
wind and shadow conditions and closed off visual access to the water. If the
plan met local zoning requirements, the project may have been built as
proposed; the citizens of the Commonwealth would then have lost a valuable
resource to commercial interests. Such a tragedy did not transpire, however,
and the events that did occur once the developers voluntarily put their
project on hold are indicative of Chapter 91's success at fostering a
collaborative, "stop and think" approach to development at the water's edge.
In May of 1998, the Boston Globe and The Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT) convened a Boston Harbor Conference, 31 which included
a televised town meeting held at Faneuil Hall. The purpose of the confer-
ence was to establish options for the harbor's future, given "the conflicting
constituencies, political intrigue, overlapping jurisdictions, and high stakes
involved in developing Boston's 'new frontier' in the South Boston Seaport
District."'39 One of the findings of the Conference was that "[p]arks and
open space also determine the quality of life in the public realm."'
140
However, the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) apparently did not
give much consideration to this finding, as evidenced by the interim Seaport
plan it released in November of 1998. The interim plan allowed office
towers to dominate the waterfront and was consequently sent back to the
drawing board by a host of critics.'4 ' The "Seaport Public Realm Plan" was
136. See Jennifer Babson, Fan Pier Complex on Hold, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 3, 1998, at
Dl.
137. See id.
138. See generally, Harbor Conference: A New Role for Media, BOSTON GLOBE, June
12, 1998, at A27. The participants at this Conference included the head of the Boston
Redevelopment Authority, representatives from Massport; the secretary of the Executive
Office of Environmental Affairs; citizens of South Boston; the head of the Boston Harbor
Association; and numerous architects. See Anthony Flint, The Hot Spot, BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 25, 1998, special supplement at 9.
139. Babson, supra note 136.
140. Timothy Leland & Thomas Piper, Plotting the Course, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 25,
1998, special supplement at 4.
141. Flint, supra note 131, at 8.
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then delivered to Boston's City Hall on March 1, 1999.142 The plan includes
low-level buildings, parks, and civic destinations in addition to housing,
hotels, office buildings, and restaurants.143  Although the plan is not a
"master" plan and does not contain zoning regulations, the plan does create
the foundation for significant public access and accommodation. Specifi-
cally, the plan calls for the developers of Fan Pier to create a waterside park
and public destination point on the portion of the land closest to the water"
Perhaps as a mitigation measure for the allowance of some higher buildings
in the central portions of Fan Pier, the plan requires landowners, whose
parcels are situated further from the water, to contribute to a central fund to
create public amenities.'45 The Seaport document is a collaborative product
thatrepresents the varied interests of several parties, but it remains to be seen
whether the individual plans of Fan Pier developers will comply with the
framework of the Seaport plan.
4 6
Critics of Chapter 91 may point to delays in the Fan Pier project as
evidence of the inefficiency of the regulations for the promotion of
waterfront development. The delays, however, are warranted if they result
in a waterfront district that everyone can live with and enjoy. Although the
original plan proposed by the developer of Fan Pier included some open
space, the concern was that the footprint and shadows created by the extreme
height of the building would render the open space uninviting. Boston
already lacks sufficient hotel space and the demand is expected to increase
further once the convention center opens in South Boston. The "stop and
think" approach effectuated by Chapter 91 is therefore particularly important
during this time of rapid growth and development, replete with correspond-
ing political pressure to rush projects. Although some will argue that the
hotel and office complex proposal was acceptable given that it provided
greater public use than its current use as a parking lot, 47 the fact remains that
142. See Anthony Flint, Planners Focus on Seaport Details, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 1,
1999, at B5.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. As of the writing of this comment, the Fan Pier developers have released their most
recent proposal, including a public realm plan to the public, but have not yet filed with the
Boston Redevelopment Authority or state environmental agencies. See Anthony Flint, Fan
Pier Plans Fan Out New Proposal Mixes PublicAccess, Housing, Business, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 10, 1999, at B1. Initial reaction, as measured by the press accounts, indicates that the
lack of sufficient residential units, the lack of a "signature" open space, and the number of
cars the complex would accommodate are the majorpoints of contention among stakeholders.
See id.
147. See e.g., Flint, supra note 131. "Everyone needs to relax a little bit, and remember
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the public has a real interest in this land and the potential for a thriving
waterfront community exists until the land is developed without regard for
the unique and irreplaceable significance of the property. The delays caused
by Chapter 91 were beneficial: they caused government agencies, develop-
ers, urban planners, architects, environmental groups, and citizens to
collaborate and create a harbor plan that ensures that the public's interest
will not succumb to another mass of steel and glass.
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment has demonstrated that the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts takes seriously its sovereign obligation to protect its citizens' interests
in tidelands. This sovereign obligation has its roots in a body of law that
pre-exists the Commonwealth itself. The Commonwealth gave statutory
effect to its sovereign obligation in its adoption of the Chapter 91 tidelands
licensing statute, which enjoyed a somewhat uncontroversial history until the
landmark Boston Waterfront decision was handed down.
Although the validity of the 1990 regulations, which were enacted in
part as a response to Boston Waterfront, has been subject to attack on several
grounds by commentators, no court has yet had the opportunity to respond
to these attacks. Chapter 91 's record of engendering voluntary compliance
and the lack of court appeals for Chapter 91 determinations may, however,
be indicative of the validity of the 1990 regulations. The 1990 regulations
will remain intact unless the court is presented with the opportunity, and
decides to take the opportunity, to severely limit the holding of Boston
Waterfront.
As the South Boston waterfront project makes evident, Chapter 91 and
its attendant regulations have successfully preserved the public's interests in
the shores of the sea. The South Boston waterfront story highlights both the
strength and the flexibility of the regulations. In absence of the regulations,
the public's interests in the waterfront property would likely have been
sacrificed to the developer's plan for skyscrapers that would not have even
provided sight, much less access, to the water. On the other hand, without
the municipal harbor plan provisions of the regulations, the site may have
continued as a parking lot with no progress made towards the creation of a
vibrant waterfront community. The regulations accordingly strike the
delicate balance between the prevention of careless development and the
prevention of any development whatsoever. If the final master plan is
that what's out there today is a giant parking lot, with no access to the water's edge" (quoting
Thomas O'Brien, Head of Boston Redevelopment Authority).
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successful in both its design and implementation, other coastal states will
have one more testimony to the.marked effectiveness of Chapter 91 as a
model for state stewardship of coastal lands.
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